摘要
中国上市公司控制权市场、经理人市场和经理人激励对舞弊行为影响的检验结果表明,在控制权市场竞争中只有第二大股东的制衡力量对舞弊行为起到显著的抑制作用,经理人市场的竞争程度与公司舞弊行为显著负相关,不成熟的经理人市场使得经理人的声誉机制和报酬激励机制都难以发挥抑制舞弊行为的作用。治理上市公司舞弊行为的更好路径是优化经理人的选任机制和竞争机制,而不是仅仅强化其激励。
By testing the effect of control rights market, manager market and manager incentive on firm fraud behaviors, the results indicate： （1） Only the second largest shareholder can restrain firm＇s fraud behaviors effec- tively in the control rights market competition of listed companies. （2） There is significantly negative association between manager market competition and the likelihood of firm fraud. （3） The reputation and compensation incen- tive mechanism can＇t effectively prevent corporate frauds due to the fallow competition of Chinese manager market. Therefore, the better measure of deterring fraud behavior is to perfect the mechanism of manager nomination and competition mechanism, not to enhance top manager compensation incentive only.
出处
《经济理论与经济管理》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第8期57-62,共6页
Economic Theory and Business Management
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(70672101)
关键词
市场竞争
激励
舞弊行为
market competition
incentive
fraud behavior
