摘要
一个由制造商和供应商组成的两级供应链中,制造商通过价格补贴和转移支付的方式激励供应商进行技术创新的契约机制。在三种博弈形式下制造商与供应商的选择策略及利润函数,结果表明:协同创新时,供应链系统能够达到有效帕累托最优。同时Rubinslein讨价还价模型对供应链系统的剩余价值进行再分配。
In a double - level supply chain composed of manufacturer and supplier the former stimulates the latter to innovate by the contractual policies of price reimbursement and transferred payment. By comparing the strategy - choosing and relevant profit functions in three forms of fame theory, the result demonstrates that supply chain system can achieve the best feasible Pareto etEciency by co- operative innovation. By Rubinsle Bargin Model can be distributed the surplus value of supply chain system.
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2007年第9期41-44,共4页
Commercial Research
基金
科技部重点科技项目
项目编号:2004EP030002。
关键词
供应链
协调创新
激励
博弈论
supply chain
co- operative innovation
incentive mechanism
game theory