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基于成本优势的企业横向兼并行为分析 被引量:1

Behavior Analysis on the Cost Advantage-Based Enterprise Horizontal Annexation
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摘要 以具有技术兼容的同质产品企业为研究对象,从供应链的角度,对这些企业采取横向兼并行为以获取竞争优势的有关问题进行分析研究。研究结果表明,在n—m家零售商兼并后不改变零售层定货决策权威对称性的情况下,兼并不可能同时使供应链中所有成员都增加收益;但在一定的条件下,兼并能使供应链中部分成员增加收益,当零售层企业很多且仍有较多的零售商未参与兼并时,若兼并企业能减少单位运作成本且减少幅度不超过临界值,就能同时保证所有零售商的收益增加,但使供应商的收益减少;反之,只要兼并所减少的单位运作成本幅度超过临界值,兼并将使参与者和供应商增加收益,而未参与兼并的零售商收益减少;但只要零售商兼并后稍具有成本优势,就能提高整个供应链的收益。 From the angle of the supply chain, relevant problems that enterprises take horizontal annex to gain competition advantage was analyzes, and its research object is the same quality product and technology compatibility enterprises. The result of research showed that the member enterprises in the supply chain couldnt increase profits simultaneously, after several shopkeepers annexed and didnt change the symmetry of the goods decision-making authority in retail layer. But under certain conditions, part of members in the supply chain could increase profits in the annexation. When there are so many retail layer enterprises and the shopkeepers dont participate in the annexation, the annexation makes all shopkeepers increase profits and the providers decrease interests, if the annexation enterprises reduce the unit running cost and its range deesnt exceed the critical value. Contrarily, the annexation will make the participators and the providers increase profits as long as what it reduces the unit running cost exceeds the critical value, and while the profits of ones who dont take part in the annexation will be reduced. The whole supply chain increase incomes as long as the shopkeepers win a litter cost advantage after the annexation.
作者 李国良
机构地区 东南大学
出处 《流体机械》 CSCD 北大核心 2007年第8期34-38,共5页 Fluid Machinery
关键词 同质产品企业 技术兼容 横向兼并 成本优势 same quality product enterprise technology compatibility horizontal annexation cost advantage
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参考文献10

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