摘要
"加强知识产权保护能吸引更多外商直接投资(FDI),并能使后发国受益"这一命题能否构成支持加强后发国知识产权保护的论据?文章将知识产权保护对FDI、自主创新、国内模仿和国外模仿的影响纳入三方参与的两阶段动态博弈模型,讨论后发国通过加强知识产权保护来吸引FDI的政策效应。分析认为后发国通过加强知识产权保护能吸引更多FDI,但并不一定能从中获益。因为:FDI偏向进入能够对后发国产生最小收益的产业;加强知识产权保护产生了大量国际收入转移;通过加强知识产权保护,由FDI进入新行业而增加的利润将被已有FDI产业利润的减少所抵消。根据各行业特征选择相应的最优知识产权保护才能使总体福利最大化。
It is argued that lagging countries will benefit from strengthening intellectual property right protection aiming at attracting FDI, can this argument support the stronger IPR protection? This paper develops a model to analyze the policy effects of strengthening IPR on FDI, self-innovation and imitation. The results show that lagging countries can attract more FDI by strengthening IPR protection, but do not necessarily benefit from it. The reasons are that FDI occurs in industries that generate the smallest benefits for the lagging countries, stringent IPR protection induce income transfer from home to abroad, and any gains from tightening IPR protection to attract FDI in better industries may be offset by losses in other industries. Only the optimal IPR protection according to each industry can maximize the overall welfare.
出处
《财经研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第9期49-60,共12页
Journal of Finance and Economics
基金
国家社会科学基金重点项目(06AJLY005)