上市公司股权融资偏好的经济分析

Economic Analysis on the Equity Financing Preference of Listed Companies

中国上市公司存在强烈的股权融资偏好,严重有悖于现代财务理论中的"啄食顺序原则"。分析指出,在当前经济转轨的特殊制度环境下,中国企业融资成本发生了显著的体制性变异,股权融资的实际成本受到严重扭曲,致使上市公司产生强烈的股权融资偏好。从效率上看,政府对国有企业的政策倾斜使股票市场形成一种分离均衡,股权融资出现"双轨制",国有企业与非国有企业融资便利程度迥异,由此导致二者融资成本与融资量的不同。国有企业的融资便利是以牺牲投资者福利和非国有企业的高融资成本为代价的。

Chinese listed companies had a strong preference for equity financing. This violated the perking order rule in modern capital structure theory. The paper shows that the capital cost of equity financing for Chinese firms was distorted by the government intervention and they revealed strong motivation to issue stocks. The controlling equilibrium in the equity Financing market forms a two- railed mechanism and the state - owned enterprises （SOEs） have more convenient access to the stock market than non - SOEs. SOEs and non - SOEs face different financing environments and non - SOEs should pay more to issue stocks. This will do no good to the long - run economy growth.