个人住房信贷市场的进化博弈分析

Analysis of Evolutionary Game on the Individual Housing Credit Market

目前住房信贷市场存在大量不规范行为,为此将有限理性的银行及个人的行为演化过程视为两人非对称进化博弈。博弈双方的得益是完全信息的,根据进化博弈理论和复制动态机制,建立了无约束条件下个人住房信贷进化博弈模型和有约束条件下的个人住房信贷进化博弈模型,并深入分析住房信贷市场的进化规律。结果表明,在无约束条件下,住房信贷市场有较大可能向不规范的市场进化;而在有政府适当干预或有法律监督的条件下,住房信贷市场最终都向规范合理的市场方向演化。最后,对如何形成规范合理的住房信贷市场提出了几点建议。

Great deal of substandard behavior still exists in the individual housing credit market, hence the behavior standarding amongst banks and individuals, the bounded rationality players, can be seen as asymmetric evolution game. By applying the evolution game theory and replicated dynamic equation,evolutionary game models of individual housing credit without restriction and evolutionary game models of individual housing credit with restriction are constructed. Evolution law of housing credit market is thoroughly analyzed. Finally, some suggestions on standardizing housing credit market behavior are proposed.