政府产权利益与银行不良资产生成机制探讨

A Study of Government Property Relations Interest and Bad Assets Generating Mechanism

银行的改革进行了二十几年,虽然取得了阶段性的成果,但却没有从本质上解决银行的巨额不良资产问题。本文通过建立两阶段的动态博弈模型,分析了政府与国有银行之间的利益博弈行为,阐明国有银行不良资产之所以仍然不断涌现,是由于政府对银行产权份额的过多控制而导致的。在此基础上,提出了推进彻底的银行产权制度改革,完善银行的法人治理结构的建议,以便从根本上减少银行的不良资产。

The banking reform has been carried out for 20 years. The phase achievements have been made. However the problem of huge bad assets has not still been solved. This paper sets up a two-phase dynamic model to analyze the game behavior between the government and businesses. The paper also shows that the control of the government over the bank property re- sults in the accelerating bad assets. Furthermore the paper puts forward some suggestions for promoting reform of the bank property relations and perfecting bank governance structure to ultimately reduce bad assets.