移动电信低端增量市场中的价格策略互动

Pricing Strategic Interaction Research in Low-end Incremental Mobile Telecomm Market

针对双头垄断下的移动市场竞争,在用户存在转网成本,且运营商根据用户支付意愿和网络偏好价格歧视策略条件下,采用一个三阶段动态博奕模型对运营商低端增量市场竞争中的价格策略互动进行了分析,认为前期高端市场中的不对称地位会激励不同运营商在价格竞争采取不同策略,在位运营商为了保持与原有用户的激励相容会相对保守。均衡时低端增量市场份额分布与运营商前期高端市场优势无关,而取决于其提供的用户效用水平。

Under the condition with customer switching costs, operators pricing discriminating according to the willingness to pay and network preferences of customers, duopolistic competition between mobile operators is studied by a three-stage dynamic game model focusing on pricing strategic interaction between operators competing for low-end incremental market. It is concluded that, existing asymmetric high-end market shares lead to different pricing strategies as equilibrium outcome. Conservative pricing strategy towards low-end market might be taken by the leading operator managing to keep complaint with their existing high-end customers. In equilibrium, low-end incremental market shares are independent of former highend market shares distributed over both operators, only relative to the gain of customers.