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基于LSM的动态多策略研究与实现 被引量:2

Research and implementation of dynamic and multiple security policies on LSM
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摘要 安全需求多样化对操作系统提出支持大量广泛的安全策略灵活性要求。这些灵活性需要支持控制访问权限的转移,执行细粒度的访问控制和撤消之前许可的访问权限。传统操作系统把对安全策略的支持分散到系统相关功能模块中,难以满足这种需求。通过对操作系统中策略相关功能部件的研究,介绍并分析了一种基于通用访问控制框架LSM的动态多策略安全体系结构,阐述了如何把主流Flask体系结构和LSM合理有效的结合以及在Linux上的实现。 the research of all the facilities related to security policy in the system, a security architecture is introduced and analyzed based on dynamic and multiple security policies, a general access control framework LSM, and how to adopt Flask and LSM reasonably and effectively is discussed and implemented based on Linux.
作者 佘影 陈蜀宇
出处 《计算机工程与设计》 CSCD 北大核心 2007年第17期4108-4111,共4页 Computer Engineering and Design
基金 教育部"新世纪优秀人才支持计划"基金项目(NCET-04-0843)
关键词 动态多策略 安全模块 安全体系结构 安全域 安全操作系统 dynamic and multiple security policy LSM security architecture secure fields secure operating system
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参考文献8

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共引文献31

同被引文献21

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