3David Papineau, Thinking About Consciousness, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002,p. 92, p. 144, pp. 148-149, p. 15, pp. 17-18, pp. 253-254, p. 254, pp. 24-25.
4Brain Loar, " Phenomenal States," in J. Tomberlin (ed), Philosophical Perspectives, vol. 4, 1990.
5Christopher Hill and Brian Mclaughlin, "There are Fewer Things in Reality than are Dreamt of in Chalmers's Philosophy," Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 59, 1998.
6David Papineau, " Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts".T. Alter and S. Walter (eds), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
7David Chalmers, " Phenomenal Concepts and the Explanatory Gap" .T. Alter and S. Walter (eds), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
8Joseph Levine, " Phenomenal Concepts and the Materialist Constraint". T. Alter and S. Walter (eds), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, New York: Oxford University Press, 2006.
9David Papineau, "Phenomenal and Perceptual Concepts" ,in T. Alter and S. Walter (eds), 2006.
二级参考文献16
1[1]Joseph Levine.Purple Haze:The Puzzle of Consciousness[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,2001.
2[2]Saul Kripke.Naming and Necessity[M].Cambridge,MA:Harvard University Press,1980.
3[3]David Chalmers.The Conscious Mind[M].Oxford:Oxford University Press,1996.
4[4]Fred Feldman.Kripke on the Identity Theory[J].The Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974).
5[5]William Lycan.Kripke and the Materialists[J].The Journal of Philosophy 71 (1974).
6[1]有兴趣的读者可参见文献:Christopher Hill and Brian Mclaughlin.There are Fewer Thingsin Realitythan Are Dreamt of in Chalmers'Philosophy[J].Philosophical and Phenomenological Research 59 (1999):P445 ～454; Katalin Balog.Conceivability,Possibility,and the Mind-Body Problem[J].Philosophical Review 108 (1999):P497 ～528; Anthony Brueckner.Chalmers'Conceivability Argument From Dualism[J].Analysis 61 (2001):P187 ～ 193; John Hawthorne.Advice for Physicalists[J].Philosophical Studies 109 (2002):P17 ～52; John Perry.Knowledge,Possibility,and Consciousness[M].Cambridge,MA:MIT Press,2001; Daniel Stoljar.The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical[J].Philosophical Perspectives 15 (2001):P393 ～413; Sara Worley.Conceivability,Possibility and Physicalism[J].Analysis 63 (2003):P15 ～23.
1Daniel Stoljar,lgnorance and Imagination: The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2006, pp. 3 - 13, p. 11, p. 27, pp. 25 - 26, p. 37, pp. 67 - 70, pp. 74 - 82, pp. 28 - 29, pp. 31 - 32, pp. 87 - 105, pp. 107 - 122, pp. 123 - 141.
2Daniel Stoljar, "Two Conceptions of the Physical", Philosophy arwl Phenomenological Research 62, 2001
3" The Conceivability Argument and Two Conceptions of the Physical", in Metaphysics, Philosophical Perspective 15,2001
4" Physicalism and Phenomenal Concepts", Mind and Language 20, 2005
5"Two Conceivability Arguments Compared" ,Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Vol. CVII,2007.
6Uriah Kriegel, "Review of Daniel Stoljar' s Ignorance and Imagination", Australasian Journal of Philosophy 86,2008
7Joseph Levine,“Review of Daniel Stoljar : Ignorance and Imagination:The Epistemic Origin of the Problem of Consciousness”, Mind 117, 2008
8Tamar Szabo Gendler and John Hawthorne ( eds. ), Conceivability and Possibility, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002.
9Torin Alter and Sven Walter ( eds. ), Phenomenal Concepts and Phenomenal Knowledge: New Essays on Consciousness and Physicalism, Oxford : Oxford University Press, 2007
10Bertrand Russell,The Analysis of Matter,London: Kegan Paul, 1927.
