摘要
本文回顾了国内有关国企改革的争论,提出产权并不是制约国企发展的关键变量,同时实施竞争性环境、减轻政策性负担、硬化预算约束这些政策也无法真正提升国企绩效。笔者认为代理成本问题是阻碍国企发展的核心环节,并建立理论模型证明激励和监督机制是解决企业代理成本的有效机制。在解决国企非效率上,因为产权变迁的问责制度都可以建立有效的激励和监督机制,所以在代理成本这个环节实现了逻辑的统一,而非国内学者所争论的那样对立。最后基于全文的分析,笔者提出在不同特性的产业,产权变迁和问责制度具有各自的优势,是国企改革的两条不同路径。
This article reviews the reform of state-owned enterprises(SOEs)in China.We propose that property right is not the key to SOEs development,and such policies as promoting competition,alleviating firm burden and enforcing budget would not be effective to better SOEs performance.We hold that agency cost is the core issue that constrains SOEs development,and put forward a theoretical model to demonstrate motivation and supervision as the effective mechanism to resolve the agency cost.As property right evolution and accountability system are to build effective motivation and supervision,thus the former two are the key to SOEs development.Finally,we propose that accountability system and property right evolution can be viewed as two different paths to SOEs reform because each of them is advantageous for specific sectors.
出处
《当代经济科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第5期1-8,共8页
Modern Economic Science
关键词
国企改革
代理成本
问责制度
产权变迁
激励机制
监督机制
SOEs reform
Agency cost
Accountabiltiy system
Property right evolution
Motivation
Supervision
