政府利益内在性的抑制与政府信用建设

Restricting Government Inherent Interests to Enhance Government Creditability

政府利益作为一种客观存在,它可能促进和维护社会公共利益,增强政府信用,也可能背离、侵犯公共利益,破坏政府信用。当政府利益内在性倾向缺乏有效约束和规范时,就会为权力腐败提供恶性膨胀的空间,导致对政府经济信用、政治信用以及社会信用的破坏,制约服务型政府的构建,因此,需要创新政府管理方式、监督机制以及政府官员的绩效评估体制,有效抑制政府利益内在性倾向,使政府保持良好信用。

Government interests exists as an objective reality. It may foster and maintain socially public interests to enhance government creditability but, in turn, it may exercise its administrative authority to violate even infringe public interests, thus damaging the government creditability. When the government inherent interests cannot be restricted efficiently due to lack of publicly-accepted supervision regulations, a space will appear, in which the power corruption tends to spread catastrophically and result in a destructive blow to government creditabilities in economy, policy and society, much less turning the government into service type. So, a thoroughly improved administration is in need for government, as well as the supervision mechanism and performance evaluation system to it. Only in this way the inherent interests of a government that tends to enlarge it can be restricted efficiently so as to maintain and further enhance its creditability.