上市公司实际控制人、多元化经营与投资者保护

De Facto Controller, Business Diversification and Investors Protection of Listed Companies

本文从上市公司实际控制人利用多元化经营侵占中小股东利益的视角,检验了其在上市公司中的控制权与现金流权分离度对多元化经营程度的影响。结果表明,控制权与现金流权分离度越高,多元化经营程度越高,且控制层级的增加会弱化控制权与现金流权分离度对多元化经营程度的影响,从而验证了我国民营上市公司的实际控制人存在利用多元化经营侵占中小股东利益的动机,并倾向于采用以较低控制层级实现较高控制权与现金流权分离度的方式实现对上市公司的控制。因此,如何保护投资者的合法权益,抑制上市公司实际控制人自利动机的多元化经营行为,成为应该关注的问题。

This paper reviews business diversification degree as a result of divergence of controlling power of de facto controller from their cash flow rights, based on the phenomenon that the de facto controller of listed companies tend to harm minority shareholder interest through business diversification. Studies show that the greater the divergence between the two, the greater the degree of diversification, and the stronger the hierarchy, the weaker the impact on diversification. The results indicate that the de facto controller of non-state owned companies are intended to implement diversification for self-interests, and are apt to controlling companies through larger separation between their voting and cash flow rights and lower hierarchy. As a result, how to protect investors＇ interests and restrain the self-interest motive of de facto controller is an issue of increasing concern.