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基于时间约束的1-1自动谈判策略 被引量:1

The 1-1 Automatic Negotiation Strategy Based on Time Constraints
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摘要 随着电子商务在Internet上的发展和人们对软件Agent兴趣的增加,对于自动谈判的研究正在迅速进行。鉴于多属性谈判中多个属性的不同报价特点,将谈判区间分为两种分别进行分析,并考虑到时间对两个Agent谈判策略的影响,建立了基于时间约束的谈判模型并给出最优报价策略。最后,给出一个原型系统并对上述模型进行应用。 With the growth of EC (Electronic Commerce) on the Internet and the increase of interests in software agents, researches for the automated negotiation are proceeding rapidly. Whereas the distinct offer characteristic of multiattribute, we divide the negotiation interval into two kinds. Considering the time effect to strategy of two agents, we built negotiation model based on time Constraints and provide optimal offer strategy. At last, We provide a prototype system and apply the above model.
出处 《系统工程》 CSCD 北大核心 2007年第8期111-114,共4页 Systems Engineering
关键词 自动谈判 谈判策略 时间约束 Automatic Negotiation Negotiation Strategy Time Constraints
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参考文献9

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同被引文献18

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