论哈贝马斯与罗尔斯对公共理性的争论

On Habermas's and Rawls's Debates on Public Reasoning

在理性多元论的情况下,为了使正义原则能够达成重叠共识,公共理性要求我们只诉诸于人们普遍接受的常识性信念和推理形式来推演正义原则。哈贝马斯批评罗尔斯的论证缺少一个公共的道德视角、混淆了可接受性与实际接受的区别,以及误解了道德真理。罗尔斯认为他的论证是一种理性的公共证明,而不是一种妥协,并且认为没有必要承认重叠共识的认知意义。我们认为,罗尔斯的无知之幕限制了公共理性,道德哲学不应该放弃道德真理的追问,哈贝马斯的道德商谈模式更能保证社会的团结。

Under the circumstances of reasonable pluralism, public reasoning asks us to deduce just principles by the recognized universal beliefs and deducible forms so as to reach ＂overlapping consensus＂. Habermas criticizes that Rawls＇s justification lacks a public moral viewpoint, confuses the differences between acceptability and acceptance, and misunderstands moral truth. Rawls thinks that his justification is not a compromise but a reasonable public justification, and he thinks it is unnecessary to recognize the epistemological status of overlapping consensus. We think that Rawls＇s veil of ignorance limits public reasoning. Moral philosophy should not give up moral truth and Habennas＇s moral discoursal model can guarantee social solidarity better.