多任务委托代理模型下经营者管理协同激励机制研究

Multitask Principal-Agent Model and Study the Incentive Mechanism on Executive's Management Synergy

3.中国矿业大学,北京100083)摘要:借助委托-代理模型,针对经营者的业务和人员的两种管理活动,研究在知识经济社会,人员管理重要性不断增加的前提下,所有者最优激励机制设计和优化的问题。表明:随着人员管理的重要性上升,经营者业务管理相对有效的企业,激励强度将下降,总确定性等价将减小;而经营者人员管理相对有效的企业,激励强度将上升,总确定性等价将增加。同时对知识经济时代"以人为本"的企业管理方法的有效性做出了一种解释。

Aiming at the executive＇s two kinds of managerial actions, namely, business management and personnel management. This paper analyzed in virtue of the principle-agent model that while personnel management is increasingly important, how owner design and optimize best incentive mechanism in the knowledge economic period. The result suggests that while personnel management is increasingly important, the enterprise with more efficient in executive＇s business management will have a degressive incentive and TCE （total certainty equivalence）, and the enterprise with more efficient in executive＇s personnel management will have an ascending incentive and TCE. Meanwhile, this paper also made a kind of explanation in validity of enterprise＇s human - based management in the knowledge economic period.