摘要
文章依据代理成本、财务协同效应与财权集中程度的关系,构建出企业集团财权配置的均衡模型,揭示了财权配置的决策机理以及决策敏感因素。并以此为理论指引,论证了适合浙江民营企业集团财权配置模式的基本定位,以及对投融资决策权的具体配置方案进行了设计。
The paper construct an equilibrium model of finance-rights,allocation of group enterprise according to the functions relation between the degree of centralization and agency cost or financial synergic effect,by which,the paper explains the mechanism of allocation of finance rights and sensitive factors effecting allocation of finance rights.On the basis of above analyses,according to the realistic conditions,a model of finance rights,allocation is analyzed.Guided by the model,an arrangement about rights of investment decision and rights financing decision of private enterprise groups of Zhejiang is designed.
出处
《华东经济管理》
2007年第9期4-10,共7页
East China Economic Management
基金
浙江省社科基金课题<基于不完备契约理论的浙江民营企业财务冲突与治理研究>研究成果(编号:07CGGL043YBM)
关键词
代理成本
财务协同效应
财权配置
agency cost
financial synergic effect
allocation of finance rights