摘要
论文从经济学的视角对市场营销中的代理理论及其运用进行探讨。代理理论认为在等级的关系中,委托人只能局部地考察代理商的行为和生产能力,因此委托人面临着代理制有异化的趋势、道德风险和隐瞒行为的问题。论文集中地讨论了激励的设计,这种设计能促使代理商的行为与委托人的利益更为一致,并对完善营销代理制度提出了几点对策。
The paper intends to probe into the theory of agency and its application in marketing from economic facet. Agency theory says, in hierarchical relationship, trustee can partly inspects agent＇s behavior and productivity. Thus, trustee is confronting problems including： dissimilation of agency system, moral risks and concealment. This paper mainly discusses design of stimulation, which can make agent＇s behavior more consistent with trustee＇s interests, and it also states many measures for consummation of marketing agency system.
出处
《浙江工贸职业技术学院学报》
2007年第3期29-33,37,共6页
Journal of Zhejiang Industry & Trade Vocational College
关键词
代理
委托
激励
风险
Agency
Entrust
Stimulation
Risk
