股权价值决定:一种基于经济权力的证券资产定价模型

The Determination of the Stock Value:A New Asset Pricing Model Based on the Economic Power

本文在Nash讨价还价模型的基础上,以企业要素所有者博弈入手,以资源和经济权力禀赋为视角,重新演绎了非对等资源禀赋和权力结构下的股权定价模型。指出,股权价值取决于股东的资源和权力禀赋结构。即股东资源价值越大,则控制权越大、剩余分配越多,该股东实际股权价值越高;股东间资源禀赋越不对等,控制权结构越不平衡,企业利益侵占越严重,弱势股东的实际股权价值越低;在现实经济中,股票并非天然体现"同股同权,同股同价"特性。

Based on the multi-Nash equilibrium solution and the surplus expropriation,the paper re-expands the economic power game model of the stock price with the factor owners,to analysis the individual with different resource is how to make the distribution of the firm surplus and the stock value.The model shows that the resource is more,the control right and the stock price will be higher.Owning to the difference of the resource and the economic power structure,the stock price will be different.