制度环境与自由现金流的过度投资

Institutional Environment and Overinvestment of Free cash flow

使用自由现金流进行过度投资是经理获取私利的重要手段。我国特殊的制度背景也可能导致经理采取这种行为。本文在构造出自由现金流和过度投资的计量的基础上，以在我国沪深交易所交易的非金融类企业的2000～2004年数据为样本，考察了地方政府控制、地方政府干预和金融发展对自由现金流的过度投资的影响。本文避免了以往的投资现金流敏感性研究中无法区分竞争解释的问题，发现地方政府控制和地方政府干预显著地提高了自由现金流的过度投资，而金融发展存在熊彼特效应，即其可降低自由现金流的过度投资。

Overinvestment of free cash flow is an important means for manager to get private benefits. In China, the institutional environment also may induces such behavior. Based on the construct of free cash flow and overinvestment, taking China's non-financial firms that list in Shanghai or Shenzhen Stock Exchange between 2000 and 2004 as sample, the paper examines the impact of local government's controlling, local government's intervention and financial development on the overinvestment of free cash flow. Avoiding the inability of distinguishing competing explanations in past research on the investment-cash flow sensitivity, the paper suggests that local government's controlling and local government's intervention significantly increases the overinvestment of free cash flow, and financial development has Schumpeter effect, i.e., it decreases the overinvestment of free cash flow.