摘要
本文以2000年由中天勤或深圳华鹏所审计的公司为样本,考察了在中天勤及深圳华鹏被吊销执业资格后,样本公司的后任审计师是否将原由中天勤或华鹏审计公司的视为诉讼风险的来源之一,从而要求其采用更为稳健的会计政策。文章以操控性应计利润为衡量指标,选择了控制样本与样本进行比较分析。研究发现:无论是操控性应计利润水平还是操控性应计利润的变化值,样本公司均显著低于控制样本公司;在对待中天勤及深圳华鹏客户的态度上,国际五大的确比国内非五大事务所更稳健。但即使在控制了后任审计师为国际五大的国内合作所后,后任审计师仍会将客户原由中天勤或深圳华鹏审计视为诉讼风险的来源之一,对其要求采用更为稳健的会计政策。实证结果与审计师稳健主义相一致,表明样本公司的后任审计师的确会将客户原由中天勤或深圳华鹏审计视为诉讼风险的一种独特的来源,从而要求客户采用更为稳健的会计政策。
In this paper, we investigate whether after the demise of ZhongTianqin and Shenzhenhuapeng, successor auditors required more conservatism accounting for their clients of Ex-zhongtianqin or Ex-shenzhenhuapeng in order to minimize litigation risk. Our sample consists of listed firms who were audited by Zhongtianqin or Shenzhenhuapeng in 2000. We examine the level of and changes in the discretionary accruals of our sample in 2001 relative to a control sample. Multivariate results indicate that sample firms had lower level of and larger decreases in discretionary accruals in 2001. Further analysis indicates that whether the successor auditors is big 5 auditor has not effect on the result. Overall,it is consistent with auditor conservatism, and suggests that the successor auditors viewed the audit of ZhongTianqin and Shenzhenhuapeng as a unique sources of litigation risk.
出处
《审计研究》
CSSCI
北大核心
2007年第5期68-76,共9页
Auditing Research
基金
教育部人文社科重点研究基地基金资助(项目批准号:06JJD630015)。
