摘要
电子商务信用风险已成为电子商务进一步发展的主要障碍。建立两阶段动态博弈模型并对其求解发现,电子商务中交易者的信用度或守信度与其贴现因子以及管理者(即政府)的监管概率(即发现概率)和惩罚力度成反比;而政府的监管力度与惩罚力度、交易者贴现因子的平方以及政府的监管成本成反比。
Credit risk in e - commerce has become a major obstacle restricting its further development. Through the establishment of a 2 - phase dynamic game model and seeking for its solution, this paper finds out that the degree of credit - keeping or redit - honoring of the traders in e - commerce is in inverse proportion to the discount factors, the supervision probability （ i. e. discovery probability ） and the strength of punitive measures of the supervisor （ government ） ; the degree of supervision and the strength of punitive measures of the government is in inverse proportion to the square of the discount factors of the traders the cost of government supervision.
出处
《商业研究》
北大核心
2007年第11期173-175,共3页
Commercial Research
