司法审查的能与不能:从“麦迪逊式困境”的重新解读及其解决说起

Reinterpretation and Solution of the "Madisonian Dilemma"

美国制宪者关于"麦迪逊式困境"所涉及的两个不同原则(即多数统治与少数权利)之间相互抵牾的态度,不是通常所理解的"既不相信多数,又不信任少数",而应当被解读为"既依靠多数,又怀疑多数"。此即"麦迪逊式困境"的重新解读,其思想意识根源就在于洛克式自然法理论遭遇了美国制宪者立宪的现实主义观。这种困境的解决,最终是由民主过程与司法过程共同予以完成的,仅凭司法审查制度的运作,无法消解多数与少数之颉颃态势。

The Madisonian Dilemma refers to the attitude of the framers of the U.S. constitution to- wards the two conflicting principles （majority rule and minority rights）. It should be interpreted as ＂depending on while distrusting the majority＂, rather than ＂distrusting both the majority and the minority＂ as it is commonly understood. This reinterpretation of the Madisonian Dilemma came from the encounter between Lockeian natural law and the realism of constitutionalism of the framers. The solution to the conflict between majority rule and minority rights in practice relies on the cooperation between legislature and judiciary, rather than on the judiciary alone.