Revenue-sharing contract to coordinate independent participants within the supply chain 被引量：10

Revenue-sharing contract to coordinate independent participants within the supply chain

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摘要 To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large. To improve the performance of the supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers under deterministic price-sensitive customer demand, an optimal strategy is proposed based on knowledge discovery. First the decentralized system in which the supplier and the retailers are independent, profit-maximizing participants with the supplier acting as a Stackelberg game leader is studied. Numerical examples illustrate the importance of the coordination. The conventional quantity discount mechanism needs to be modified to coordinate the supply chain, so a revenue-sharing contract is proposed to coordinate such supply chain. Lastly, a special decision under certain demand rates is studied. The pricing and replenishment policies can be decided sequentially, which yields much less loss comparing with optimal decision when the demand rates are sufficiently large.

作者 Chen Kebing Gao Chengxiu Wang Yan

机构地区 Coll. of Science School of Mathematics and Statistics

出处《Journal of Systems Engineering and Electronics》 SCIE EI CSCD 2007年第3期520-526,共7页 系统工程与电子技术（英文版）

基金 the National Natural Science Foundation of China (70471034) the Talent Foundation of Nanjing University of Aeronautics and Astronautics (s0670-082).

关键词 supply chain management coordination mechanism revenue-sharing contract Stackelberg game sequential strategy. supply chain management, coordination mechanism, revenue-sharing contract, Stackelberg game,sequential strategy.

分类号 F274 [经济管理—企业管理]

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参考文献10

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