投资者保护视角下治理环境与股改对价之间的关系研究

Governance Environments and Consideration in Share Reform:An Investor Protection Perspective

分别使用市场化指数和政府有效性指数作为治理环境的替代变量,在投资者保护的分析框架下,本文讨论了治理环境在股改对价和送出率确定过程中的作用。我们发现,上市公司所处地区的治理环境越好,对价越低;同时,机构投资者持股比例与对价之间呈负相关关系,然而这种关系只在治理环境差的子样本中显著。总之,较好的治理环境会使上市公司产生"公司治理溢价",从而明显降低股权分置改革的成本,并可以显著缓解机构投资者和非流通股股东"合谋"侵害中小投资者利益等代理问题的发生。

Using marketalization index and government effectiveness index, this paper investigates the role of corporate governance environments in determining the consideration/payment by untradable shareholders to tradable shareholders in share reform during 2005--2007. We find that, the better the corporate governance environments, the lower the consideration. We also find that there is a negative correlation between institutional ownership and consideration, and this negative correlation is obviously lower for listed companies located in good governance environment districts than in poor governance environment districts. In conclusion, better corporate governance environment leads to lower cost in share reform due to the existence of ＂ governance premium＂ . Better corporate governance environment can also reduce the agency problems arising from the conspiracy of untradable shareholders and institutional shareholders in share reform, therefore provide better protection to minor investors.