当前我国农民维权行为的博弈分析

Game Analysis on the Behavior of Maintaining Rights of Chinese Peasants at Present

利用静态博弈理论,建立了乡村社区农民维权投入的函数模型,分析了我国农民受到权益侵害时的理性选择,验证和解释了当前我国农民无法有效维护其基本权益的原因及现实约束,讨论了在外部干预条件下农民维权的行为选择,为解决我国农民的维权问题提供了一个新的视角。

The function model of the input of maintaining rights of peasants in rural communities was set up by static game theory. The sensible choice of Chinese peasants when they met rights and interests invasion was analyzed. The reason and real restriction why Chinese peasants couldn＇t effectively protect their basic rights and interests at present were validated and explained, The behavior choice of peasants in maintaining their rights under external intervention was discussed. It provided a new visual angel for solving the problem of ma/ntaining fights of peasants in China.