权力视角下的企业契约分解与变迁

Decomposition and Transition of Firm Contracts on the Basis of Power

本文以权力为逻辑起点,分析了企业契约中控制权的来源及其在不同企业成员之间的配置,本文认为企业控制权倾向于配置给企业成员中有权力的一方,企业契约的签订是双方权力结构的形式化过程。根据契约剩余和控制权配置的不同,可以将企业契约分解为市场契约、科层制契约和关系契约三种不同性质的契约,这一结论在理论上解释了企业契约与市场契约的不同。企业契约的剩余给契约调整提供了空间,在持续交易的过程中权力结构的变化则为契约调整和变迁提供了原动力。但是企业契约变迁具有路径依赖的性质,并且企业制度并不是效率演进的。

This paper takes the economic power as the logical beginning. It is analyzed on how right of control to be distributed among members in firm. And it is important to find the origin of right. Actually, it is economic power structure that determines the allocation of control right. In particular, when the asymmetry degree Of power structure is relatively large, one member tends to own right of control and the other is forced to obey the command. Otherwise, the two players will sign either specific or ambiguous treaty and, for the latter case, they will renegotiate in the future when needed. That is to say, the market contract in the firm is the same with the market transaction contract in the essence. However, firm contracts contain the relation contracts and hierarchy. The authority in the latter makes the transaction in firm differ from that in market. Signing firm contract is a process of economic power formalized. Power structure change has provided the driving force for contract transition. And the omission of contract has reserved the probability of contract adjustment. However, transition of contract might be inefficient.