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公司整体上市有利于改善投资者利益保护吗? 被引量:16

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摘要 近两年来,我国政策制定层面和实务界普遍认为,公司整体上市有利于改善投资者利益保护。本文从公司上市模式这一视角,在界定投资者利益保护这一指标内涵的基础上,利用2003-2005年我国上市公司数据,对整体上市是否改善了投资者利益保护这一问题进行实证检验。研究表明,公司集团整体上市较分拆上市等其他模式在投资者利益保护的诸多方面存在显著差异;尽管集团整体上市的公司在投资者利益保护的某些方面较非整体上市的公司做得好一些,但是在更多的方面,集团整体上市较非整体上市的公司做的更差。这一研究具有重要的政策含义:当前被政策当局和业界普遍看好的集团整体上市,并不一定能显著改善我国资本市场和上市公司的投资者利益保护较差这一现状。
出处 《经济科学》 CSSCI 北大核心 2007年第5期77-88,共12页 Economic Science
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参考文献17

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二级参考文献24

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