中国上市公司侵占性关联并购的实证研究

An Empirical Study on Exploitive Related Party M&A of Chinese Listed Companies

关联并购在中国一直是控股股东支持或者侵占上市公司利益的一种较为普遍的手段。良好的公司治理机制,配套以良好的外部治理环境和较少的政府控制,对于侵占性关联并购起到了有效的抑制作用。实证结果表明,相对于内部治理本质建设而言,减少地方政府的控制和加强治理环境的建设更为迫切。

Controlling shareholders usually make use of related party M＆A to popping or tunneling from listed companies. Basing on the sample of the exploitive related party M＆A, this article investigates the influences of corporate governance to the related party M＆A. Good corporate governance could reduce the exploitive related party M＆A and less local government control and better govemance environment are the foundation of good corporate govemance.