大股东控制的微观结构、激励效应与堑壕效应——国外公司治理前沿研究的新趋势

Micro-structure of Majority Shareholder Control & Incentive and Entrenchment Effect

大股东控制已经成为经济学界和财务学界理论与实证研究的热点问题之一。本文回顾了公司治理领域关于大股东控制问题的最新研究成果,主要包括大股东控制存在的普遍性、大股东控制权与现金流权的分离模式、大股东控制的激励效应和堑壕效应,梳理了该领域的研究脉络,并对主要发现和结论进行总结和评论。文献研究表明,股权集中的内在机制不仅在于大股东有动力和机会增加所有股东都可以获得的共享收益,而且大股东可以通过消耗公司资源来获得小股东无法分享的控制权隐性收益,并导致企业价值的下降。最后,结合中国资本市场和公司治理结构的实际情况,提出了未来研究的新方向。

Majority shareholder control has become a hot issue of theoretical and empirical study in economics and accounting areas. This paper reviews the latest research results in corporate governance,covering areas like universality of large shareholders＇ control, separation pattern of control rights and cash flow rights, incentive and entrenchment effect of majority shareholders＇ control. The main discoveries and conclusion of these studies are summarize and commented on. It suggests that the inner mechanism of share concentration is that majority shareholders have the motivation and chance to increase the common benefits enjoyed by all shareholders, and above all, they can make private benefits by taking advantage of corporate resource. New ideas are put forward for future research in hope that they can be applied to China capital market and corporate governance.