摘要
特定民企收购国有控股上市公司从福音到梦魇的并购异象显然无法用经典的并购协同理论来解释。文章由此引出控制权(私人)收益的概念及其内在逻辑,进而推导得出一个以预期控制权私人净收益函数为核心内容的民企收购国有控股上市公司理性决策模型,接着以四川泰港与西藏天科并购重组ST包装为典型案例验证理论模型的正确性。文章认为,在股权分置、监管不力、会计规则不完善的制度背景下,形式多样、数额巨大的控制权私人收益是并购重组从福音嬗变成梦魇的根源所在,亟待针对性的系统治理。
The classical theorem of M & A can not explain the abnormal phenomena that, after the individual-founded bidders merge and reorganize state-owned controlling listed corporations, they make full use of its control rights and seek all kinds of possible private benefits until the corporations are tunneled up. Base on this perplexity, the paper introduces the concept of private benefit of control and its endogenous logic, constructs a rational model of net private benefit function for the individual-founded enterprises, and uses the case of Sichuang Taigang and Xizhang Tianke Co., Ltd. merging and reorganizing Sichuang Package Corporation to verify the forecasting value of this theoretical model. The paper argues that, in the context of equity division, weak regulation and developing accounting rules, the private benefits of control in M & A which have so many forms and constitute so large volume that they doom to become the inducement that leads M & A to change from gospel to incubus. Therefore, it's urgent to systematically regulate such benefits.
出处
《管理评论》
2007年第9期46-54,21,共10页
Management Review
基金
国家自然科学基金项目资助(70303014)
教育部人文社科重点项目资助(05JJD630027)