我国金融风险与政府投资行为：理论与实证分析

Financial Risks and Government Investment Behaviour in China:Theoretical and Empirical Analysis

我国经济增长方式属于政府主导的速度型经济,在经济快速增长中,政府的投资行为起到了非常重要的作用。由于地方政府与中央政府的目标冲突,地方政府效用函数的最优解与中央政府效用函数的最优解并不一致,因此地方政府的过度投资会导致国家整体的经济稳定性降低,使宏观经济运行不稳定,而经济增长的起落必然形成大量的银行坏账。同时,地方政府的扩张冲动必然表现为对金融资源和对金融资源控制权的竞争,而地方政府通过对金融机构的影响来争夺货币资源,会导致货币供应量突破预定的目标,引发通货膨胀。改革开放后,我国几次金融风险的产生充分证明了其与政府投资行为有着密切的关系。

The economic growth pattern in China is dominated by Chinese government and governmental investment behaviors play an very important role in the economic growth. Different economic goals result in different best solutions for economic growth for local and central government. The over-investing behaviors of local governments will reduce the macroeconomic stability. The up-and-downs of economic growth will accumulate large numbers of bad debts for banks. At the same time, the over-investments of local governments will lead to the hot competition for financial resources and the controlling rights for these financial resources. And this competition will bring about excess money supply and inflation. It has been proved that there is close relation between financial risk and government investment behavior since China adopted opening up policies