企业集团、政府控制与投资效率

Business Group,Government Control and Investment Efficiency

本文以我国上市公司2000—2004年的经验数据为样本,实证分析了企业集团和政府控制对企业投资效率的影响。结果表明,相对于独立上市公司而言,附属于企业集团的上市公司投资模式更为正常,其投资的价值损害效应也更轻,但其市场价值却显著更低。进一步分析发现,对于地方政府控制的上市公司而言,企业集团的效率促进作用相对有限,但其价值损害效应却最为强烈。基于上述证据和中国的制度背景,本文认为,我国的企业集团具有效率促进和恶化分配效应的两面性,地方政府干预是决定企业集团成本和效益变化的一个重要原因。

By taking the empirical data of listed companies from 2000 to 2004, this paper investigates the effects of business groups and government control on Investment Efficiency. The result shows that comparing with the independent firms, group-affiliation firms＇ investment pattern is more normal and investment value-destroy effect is slighter, but their market value is lower. However, as for the local government controlled listed companies, their investment efficiency enhancing is limited through affiliation with groups, but investment value-destroy effect is severest. Therefore, the conclusion indicates that the business group in China has both efficiency enhancing and deteriorating distribution effects. Particularly, local government＇ s influence is an important determinant of the benefits and costs of group affiliation.