论不对称总需求冲击下的货币政策博弈与汇率稳定

On Monetary Policy Game and Exchange Rate Stability Under Asymmetric IS Shocks

本文创建了一个"核心—外围三国博弈模型";在此分析框架内,重点研究了当面临一次非对称的总需求冲击时,国家集团之间货币政策博弈的均衡问题,以及固定汇率制国家放弃该汇率制度的条件与时机。结论认为:汇率制度和汇率水平稳定与否,不仅取决于外生经济冲击的量级,更取决于冲击的对称性;当核心国与浮动外围国采取合作的态度时,纳什均衡更容易实现,更有利于国际货币体系的稳定;实行钉住汇率制的关键在于政府当局的能力和信心;文章最后探讨和分析了我国应对当前经济冲击的宏观经济政策取向。

This paper divides the countries in the current international monetary system （CIMS） into three blocs, that is, the core, the floating periphery and the pegged periphery, and constructs a so-called Tri-Country Core-Periphery Came Model. In virtue of this framework, this paper studies the equilibrium of the monetary policy game among the three blocs under the asymmetric shocks of total demand, and the conditions and timings a country gives up the fixed exchange rate regime. The main conclusion shows that ： whether exchange rate or exchange rate regime is stable or not rests less with the degree of exogenous shocks, and more with the asymmetry of the impact. When the core takes a cooperative attitude with the floating periphery, the Nash equilibrium and the stability of the CIMS are more likely to be realized. The key to implement the peg system lies on the government＇ s capacity and confidence. These conclusions are beneficial for China to grasp the correct monetary and exchange rate policy orientation in weakening the asymmetric IS shocks and promoting the exchange rate coordination in East Asia.