附加职工安置约束的国企产权拍卖机制研究

On the Mechanism of Auctioning the SOE in China with the Constraint of Accommodating Employees

国企产权转让牵涉到国有企业利益相关者利益的重新调整,因此其交易机制的设计不仅要使国有企业以尽可能高的价格出售,还要充分考虑其他非价格因素,如国企职工的安置,企业未来的发展等。本文提出了一种附加职工安置约束的国企产权拍卖机制,通过在价格投标中增加职工安置人数的约束,该机制实现了潜在投资者在国企产权转让价格和安置职工人数两个维度上的竞争,从而使政府能够很好地兼顾不同的目标。职工安置约束要发挥预期的效果,需要政府对职工安置问题显示出足够的重视程度,同时设置最优的职工安置人数最低标准。如果政府能够根据当地经济的发展状况制定一个明确的失业补偿标准以减小投资者安置职工的成本差异,或者吸引更多异质性较大的战略投资者积极参与国企产权拍卖,将有助于其目标的实现。

The transfer of SOE＇s property right involves benefits readjustment of its stakeholders ; therefore the design of the trading mechanism is not only to sell the SOE with a high price but also to realize other non-price objectives such as rearrangement of original employees, further development of the enterprise etc. This paper constructs a bidding mechanism with the constraint of accommodating employees to analyze the tradeoff between maximizing SOE auction revenue and minimizing induced unemployment. By adding that the winner is required to settle down a certain quantity of former SOE employees in the new enterprise, this mechanism brings on the competition among prospective investors in both the price and the quantity of employment, which can help the government to balance the different objectives more efficiently. However, the constraint will only work under the condition that the government has stressed sufficiently on the employees＇ rearrangement and set the best constraint threshold. Moreover, the government should set an explicit compensation standard for the induced lay-offs to eliminate the investors＇ accommodating cost dispersion and introduce more strategic investors with considerable heterogeneity to participate in the bidding.