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论团体贷款的效率改进

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摘要 斯蒂格利茨证明了由于信息不对称,市场中将会产生混合均衡。在上述状态下,银行贷款的效率将不能达到帕累托最优,除非存在分离均衡。然而,分离均衡并不总是存在。本文通过相关的制度设计,建立两人的团体贷款模式,以期产生分离均衡,突破效率困境。
作者 陈传永
出处 《商业时代》 北大核心 2007年第27期74-75,共2页 Commercial
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参考文献4

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二级参考文献10

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