改良的可靠主义

The Reformist Reliabilism

可靠主义是当代知识论中的一个重要范畴,经过数十年的发展,仍是当前讨论知识与确证的最主要对象和运用的最基本概念之一。自其出现、发展至今,可靠主义已经发生了转变。当前的可靠主义理论已经偏离了传统的外在主义途径,转而向内在主义与外在主义的调和,甚至完全偏向内在主义。我们没有否认可靠主义转向的正确性和重要意义,因为知识的获得,必然要综合内在因素和外在因素。如果把戈德曼以及阿姆斯特朗等人早期对可靠主义的论述看作传统阶段,或传统意义上的可靠主义,那么后来对可靠主义进行修正与发展则可视作改良的可靠主义。本文结合戈德曼新确证理论、格雷科的主体可靠主义、斯杜普的内在主义可靠论,探讨有别于传统的改良的可靠主义,并认为可靠主义尽管经历了变化,但"可靠性"、"过程"的内涵则一直在延续,所变的也只是这个过程中的主体和对象,表现为"德性"或"特性"等。

Reliabilism works as one significant category in the contemporary Theory of Knowledge （Epistemology） for tens of years, while it is still one of the most principal objects and most essential concepts used in the current discussion of knowledge and justification. It has been changing since its starting point, and can be easily seen that the present reliabilism has departed from the traditional Externalism, diverting to the integration of Internalism and Externalism or even leaning to an obvious Internalism. We never deny the validity and significance of this diversion or turn, since the acquisition of know;edge has to invoke to the combination of both internal and external factors. If early treatments of relia bilism by A. I. Goldman and D. Armstrong could be counted as the traditional phase or the tradit;onal reliabllism, the later amendments or developments may be considered the reformed reliabilism, such as the justification theory advanced by Go;dman in 1980s and 90s, J. Grecds agent reliabilism, M. Steup＇s internalist reliabilism. This paper inquires the reformed reliabilism differing from the traditionalist, and holds that the implication of the reliability and process has been preserved and what has been transformed refers to the subject and object during the process, represented as virtues or properties, despite there is much change occurr＇ng to reilabilism.