自然主义认识论背景下的先验性

A Priori Under the Background of Naturalistic Epistemology

在20世纪,认识论研究主要围绕知识的辩护问题展开,即我们如何才能掌握关于这个世界的知识。自然主义在探索认识论问题的过程中,初期以奎因和戴维特为代表,以拒斥先验知识作为其主要特征。然而最近,以菲利普.基奇尔和艾尔文.戈德曼为代表的一些自然主义认识论者试图为先验知识的存在和重要性进行辩护。先验作为非经验来源,先验知识所依赖的辩护类型以及不可修正性的合理性问题是自然主义认识论者针对先验问题进行争论的焦点所在,以这些问题为线索,本文将重点展开对自然主义背景下上述先验反对者和改造者的论述,并加以简要分析。

During the 20th century, the study of epistemology was mainly about the justification of knowledge, which talks about how we can prove the knowledge of the world. Naturelistic epistemology can be regarded as a decisive turn of naturalism in epistemology. Quine is best known for advocating this view. He points out that the empirical way is the bas＇s of science. That is why he rejects the ＂a priori＂ knowledge. Recently, the ＂a priori＂ modifiers presented a conception of naturalistic epistemology that is entirely compatible with a priori justification or knowledge. Goldman and Kiteher are the leading experts ：n this field. This paper tries to compare the ＂a priori＂ opponents of naturalized epistemology with the ＂a priori＂ modifiers and analyzes the basic differences between them and their correlations. It is clear that this analysis can influence the future thinking about epistemology.