不对称信息下风险投资家与风险企业家之间的委托代理问题研究

Formation and Governance of Principal-agent Risk between Venture Capitalists and Entrepreneurs with Asymmetric Information

风险投资体系以多重激励和不对称信息为特征,风险投资的三方利益主体之间存在着双重委托-代理关系,有效控制代理风险是风险投资高效运作的基本前提。本文基于信息经济学原理,分析了风险投资家与风险企业家之间代理风险的成因,并从委托人的角度讨论了风险治理的原则和投资契约的构造。

Venture capital system is marked with multiple incentive and asymmetric information. There are two principal - agent relations among the three parts of the venture capital system, so the effective operation of venture capital is based on the governance of principal - agent risk. This article analyses the formation of the principal-agent risk between venture capitalists and entrepreneurs, and discusses the governance of the risk in view of the venture capitalist.