摘要
将稳定集的定义扩展到局中人集合是可数集的联盟对策中,并证明若局中人集合是可数集的凸联盟对策在总的联盟是连续的,那么它的核心是唯一的Von Neumann-Morgenstern稳定集。
The definition of stable set was extended to convex coalitional games with a countable set of players. The results show that if a convex game with a countable set of players is continuous at the grand coalition, then its core is the unique Von Neumann- Morgenstern stable set.
出处
《河北工程大学学报(自然科学版)》
CAS
2007年第3期104-106,共3页
Journal of Hebei University of Engineering:Natural Science Edition