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连续凸对策的一个特殊解

A special solution of continuous convex games
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摘要 将稳定集的定义扩展到局中人集合是可数集的联盟对策中,并证明若局中人集合是可数集的凸联盟对策在总的联盟是连续的,那么它的核心是唯一的Von Neumann-Morgenstern稳定集。 The definition of stable set was extended to convex coalitional games with a countable set of players. The results show that if a convex game with a countable set of players is continuous at the grand coalition, then its core is the unique Von Neumann- Morgenstern stable set.
作者 王振吉
出处 《河北工程大学学报(自然科学版)》 CAS 2007年第3期104-106,共3页 Journal of Hebei University of Engineering:Natural Science Edition
关键词 Von Neumann-Morgenstem稳定集 联盟对策 核心 Von Neumann- Morgenstern stable set coalitional game core
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参考文献4

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  • 3CALVO E, CARLOS J. Weighted weak semivalues[J]. International Journal of Game Theory, 2004, (2) :29:1 - 9.
  • 4KUHN H W, TUCKER A W. Annals of mathematics studies [J]. University Press Princeton, 2006, 28:307-312.

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