摘要
文章论述了专用性资产的理论,并研究了企业通过对专用性资产的投资而产生的套牢行为,提出了纵向一体化行为在解决企业套牢行为过程中的作用。通过对这些行为的分析,进行了企业管理理论的一些深刻思考。
出处
《经济师》
2007年第11期30-30,32,共2页
二级参考文献21
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