一个优序融资理论的解析模型

An Interpreting Model of the Pecking Order Theory

企业资本结构安排决定了资本市场的形成与发展,资本市场的现实状况又制约着企业资本结构的优化决策。本文从逆向选择角度,利用图解及数学模型分析解释了企业优序融资理论。基于假定(两类)企业对于其项目利润控制能力(能否使Rs>Rf)是不同的,通过对"共同均衡"和"个体均衡"的分析,认为企业优序融资行为的原因在于"逆向选择",而非"道德风险"。

Viewing the entrepreneurs and banks by graphic solution, the paper analyses the pecking order theory. Driven by the assumption that the entrepreneurs differ in ability which results in relationships of first order stochastic dominance between their project returns（R^s〉R^f？）,the paper points out that pecking order theory can＇t be attributed to moral hazard but adverse selection.