基于不对称需求信息的激励机制模型研究

Incentive Mechanism in Supply Chain Management based on Asymmetric Demand Information

针对由单制造商和单销售商组成的供应链,提出了供应链双方需求信息对称情况下的激励机制模型,并在此基础上建立了供应链双方在需求信息不对称情况下的运作策略模型。制造商通过折扣,运用激励相容机制使销售商诚实申报需求信息,使得供应链利润最大化的同时供应链成员实现双赢。数字试验结果表明:①所提策略是有效的;②该策略不仅能提高制造商利润,而且也能改善销售商的利润。

An incentive mechanism model with symmetric demand information is proposed for a supply chain that consists of a single manufacturer and a single retailer. Based on such a symmetric demand information model, a discounting model under two parties having asym-metric demand information is built. This model considers the problem of how the manufacturer designs an incentive mechanism to prevent the retailer from providing false information and realize Win Win. We verify numerically that：（i） the proposed policy is valid; （ii） it not only makes the manufacturer＇s profit better but also enhances the retailer＇s profit.