网上交易中的声誉机制——来自淘宝网的证据

Reputation in China's Online Auction Market:Evidence from the Taobao Website

本文主要研究在法律缺失或法律不完善情况下网上交易中声誉机制的作用。计量回归结果显示,卖方的个人声誉(用卖方信用度来衡量)对其销售量有正面的影响,但这种影响是非线性的:存在两个临界点,低于下临界点,卖方信用度对卖家商品的销售量没有影响;高于上临界点,卖家商品的销售量也不会因为卖方信用度的提高而增加。属于商盟的卖家在给定时间内的销售量高于不属于任何商盟的卖家。从而验证了网上交易中卖家个人声誉和卖家所属商盟集体声誉的作用。本文根据实证结果进一步提出一个推测:网上交易市场存在较大的搜寻成本,这削弱了声誉机制的作用。

The biggest problem with internet shopping may be moral hazards of sellers and buyers. This two-sided prisoner＇s dilemma impedes the development of online shopping, especially in China. C2C website and other third parties established feedback system, seller coalition, and other supporting mechanisms to solve this problem. We examines the impact of sellers＇ individual reputation based on feedback system and collective reputation based on seller coalition on sellers＇ average sale in China＇s online market, using data of an online prepaid game card listed on Taobao.com. We find that sellers＇ good reputation, measured by feedback score, has a positive impact on their sale. However, marginal effect of feedback score is severely decreasing. Beyond some level, sellers＇ feedback scores have no additional impact on sellers＇ sale. We also find that sellers＇ affiliation with coalitions can increase their sale in a given period. Based on empirical results, we make a reasonable conjecture about buyers＇ purchasing habit on Taobao.com： high search cost exists in online market, which impairs the role of reputation mechanism; some buyers establish long-term relationship with sellers with good reputation to reduce search cost. In general, we show that how individual reputation and collective reputation can function well when the law and social credit system related to online trade are not immature and how private order can substitute public order in market with immature law like China.