超生产容量阻止对手进入有效性的实物期权分析

Real Options Analysis for Efficiency of Entry Deterrence with Excess Capacity

将产业中企业竞争的策略行为推广到不确定性的市场环境中,用实物期权分析方法研究了行业内的垄断企业阻止具有决策灵活性的潜在进入者时,投资超生产容量策略的有效性.研究基于行业内企业的生产容量对进入者项目价值的影响评估,给出了业内企业生产容量对对手的进入期权价值和投资决策的影响结果,证明了当潜在进入者有足够的决策灵活性:投资前持有进入期权,投资后持有暂时停止和恢复期权时,对业内企业设置的任何生产容量,潜在进入者都会等待有限的时间后投资进入行业,即在净现值分析方法下有效的、以超生产容量阻止进入的竞争策略,对于持有投资和生产决策期权的进入者是无效的.

This paper discusses the competitive behavior of the finn in the industry under uncertainty. The paper lays the emphasis of the study on the behavior of entry deterrence with excess capacity under uncertainty aiming at the efficiency of the strategy of the entry deterrence to rival who is holding options to entry. Basing on the valuing the project of the entrant in the post-entry market, the value of the options to entry and strategy of the entry affected by the capacity of the incumbent finn are given by the research. The results derived by the paper shows that contrast to the efficiency of the entry deterrence with excess capacity in against the rival without decision flexible under the NPV analysis, the same strategy to against the potential entrant who is holding options to entry before investment, options to suspend and options to resume after investment will be inefficient.