基于工期协调的项目公司与承包商收益激励模型

A Revenue Incentive Model of Project Duration Coordination between Project Corporation and Contractor

从项目公司和承包商双层角度,考虑项目公司通过显性收益激励契约手段与单一标段承包商之间就工期目标优化问题进行协调决策。假设决策过程是一个完全信息的动态博弈过程,基于博弈论并应用二层规划方法建立了以项目公司为主方、承包商为从方的Stackelberg主从递阶收益激励模型,采用逆向归纳法并引入拉格朗日函数对问题进行分情形讨论,设计了遗传算法求解该非线性规划问题的子博弈精练纳什均衡解。算例结果表明,项目公司通过提供一定的收益激励而非传统指令性手段促使承包商在可压缩范围内积极主动地去压缩项目工期,可以实现项目工期控制目标协调优化和双方收益目标的帕累托改善。

From perspective of project corporation and contractor in construction project, problem of project duration coordination decision-making between the project corporation and one contractor through explicit incentive contract was considered. Assumed that the decision-making process is a dynamic game under perfect information, a Stackelberg revenue incentive contract model with the project corporation as the leader and the contractor as the follower was constructed based on the game theory and method of hi-level programming. Based on the backward induction, Lagrange function was applied to find the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium solution of the nonlinear programming model in different conditions, and corresponding genetic algorithm was designed. Finally, a numerical study showed that revenue incentive mechanism can help to actualize optimization of project duration coordination and Pareto improvement of revenue for two parties in the contract on eondition that the project corporation expects the contractor to actively compress project duration furthest by supporting revenue incentive measures instead of traditional direct instructions.