非对称信息对高新技术企业融资的影响被引量：26

Study on Financing in Transforming Technology Achievements of High-Tech Firms and Institutional Investors under Asymmetric Information

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摘要在技术成果转化的过程中,高新技术企业与投资者之间存在着非对称信息,非对称信息导致的逆向选择和道德风险使高新技术企业面临着融资障碍。本文详细分析了高新技术企业技术成果转化过程中的非对称信息对高新技术企业融资的影响,论证了私人权益资本市场中的机构投资者能够克服技术成果转化过程中非对称信息,满足其资金需求。 In the course of transforming technology achievements, there is asymmetric information between high-tech firms and investors. Asymmetric information can lead up to adverse selection and moral hazard. The adverse selection and moral hazard make high-tech firms be confronted with financial obstacle. The paper has studied how asymmetric information influenced financing of high-tech firms in the course of the transforming technology achievements, and proved that institutional investors in private equity market would overcome asymmetric information, meet fund requirement of high-tech firms.

作者熊波陈柳

机构地区北京市发展和改革委员会中国光大银行

出处《中国管理科学》 CSSCI 2007年第3期136-141,共6页 Chinese Journal of Management Science

关键词高新技术企业技术成果转化非对称信息融资机构投资者 high-tech firm transforming technology achievements asymmetric information financinginstitutional investor

分类号 F830 [经济管理—金融学]

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参考文献15

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