信息不完全情况下房地产开发企业与商业银行之间的借贷博弈分析

Game Analysis of the Relationship of Debit and Credit Sites between Real Estate Development Enterprises and Commercial Banks with Incomplete Information

针对目前国内商业银行对房地产开发贷款逐年增加以及由此引发银行不良贷款率不断上升的现状,运用不完全信息重复博弈基本理论和方法,通过引入银行的不完全信息,建立了银行和企业之间信贷博弈模型,分不同情况分析得出相应的精炼贝叶斯均衡。结果表明,随着银行在公众中强硬形象的先验概率的增大以及对违约企业惩罚力度的加大,使得企业违约的期望得益小于按期还款的得益,银行就有积极性建立一个硬形象,从而降低银行的不良贷款率。

Based on the fact that the real estate development enterprises lend more and more money from the commercial banks and the ratio of bad loans shows the upward trends by means of basic theory and analysis method of repeated games with incomplete information and through introducing the bank＇s incomplete information, this paper establishes the model of credit games between banks and enterprises, and obtains the corresponding perfect Bayesian equilibrium by the analysis under the different conditions. The result indicates that as the increase of prior probability of banks＇ hard image in pubic and increase of punishment strength to the contract breakers, the expecting profit of the enterprises can be less than that of on-time repayment of capital, and the banks will be active in establishing a hard image so as to reduce the banks＇ bad loans.