摘要
发达国家一直将反倾销作为最重要的贸易保护政策之一,它们也是世界上最主要的反倾销措施的使用者。文章从供给的角度探讨了发达国家大量使用反倾销的原因,认为宏观经济失衡的常态是政府供给反倾销政策的外部动因,追求自身政治利益最大化是政府供给反倾销政策的内部动因,而反倾销相对于保障措施和反补贴的政治成本最小决定了政府必然偏好于使用反倾销。
Antidumping has become an important protective trade policy in developed countries, and at same time these countries are the major users in the world. This paper studies the antidumping incentives from supply perspective. It holds that, owing to the pursuit of maximizing political support, the macro-economic dis-equilibria has become external incentives for government antidumping policy. Political interests maximization has become internal reasons for antidumping policy. The lower political cost of antidumping actions than safeguard measures and anti-subsidy is the most important reason for governments to prefer anti-dumping policy.
出处
《财贸研究》
北大核心
2007年第5期41-45,共5页
Finance and Trade Research
关键词
发达国家
反倾销
动因
供给
developed countries
antidumping
incentive
supply