摘要
在资本、技术、生产规模以及外部市场等为外生给定时,职工积极性的高低取决于企业在其内部对经济活动的组织,而如何组织经济活动则取决于企业在其内部所采取的微观制度安排。本文通过一个职工积极性供求均衡模型,证明了国企职工积极性不高实际上是企业在其内部对"劳资"双方的产权地位、获取职工积极性的方式和职工报酬构成等三个方面安排不当的产物。因此,为了在改革的同时调动职工积极性,国企应该在其内部对这三个方面采取新的制度安排。
When capital, technology, scale of production and the external market are given as exogenous variables, the level of enthusiasm of workers depends on enterprises" internal organization of its economic activities, and how to organize economic activities is determined by the micro-institutional arrangements taken inside the enterprises. Through an equilibrium supply and demand model of employee enthusiasm, this paper proves that lack of initiative in state-owned enterprise workers is actually a result of the enterprises" unreasonable arrangements in the following three aspects: the status of property rights of the two parties: labor and capital, access to the required employee enthusiasm and the structure of the employee compensation. Therefore, in order to arouse employee enthusiasm in the process of reforms, state-owned enterprises should take new internal institutional arrangements in these three aspects.
出处
《湖北经济学院学报》
2007年第6期109-115,共7页
Journal of Hubei University of Economics
关键词
职工产权
模型
霍桑实验
制度安排
employee property rights
model
Hawthorne Experiment
institutional arrangements